This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a …rm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a …rm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal …rms' characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all …rms innovate, some …rms innovate and others imitate, or no …rm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We …nd that the e¢ ciency of intellectual property rights protection positively a¤ects …rms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative e¤ect. In addition, smaller …rms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German …rms from manufacturing and services sectors.
Introduction
The economic literature on innovation has provided two confronting views concerning the relationship between innovation and imitation and its implications for policy design. According to the Schumpeterian view, imitation dampens innovation as it renders innovative e¤orts unpro…table. In this view, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is a necessary mechanism that provides incentives for …rms to engage in R&D and encourages technology transfer between …rms. Therefore, a strong protection of intellectual property rights would be the optimal R&D policy (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Gallini Looking at these contradictory views the question of what should be the optimal balance of innovation and imitation arises. Certainly, the evidence on innovative activity at the …rm level suggests elevated heterogeneity in innovative performance within as well as across markets. The heterogeneity observed is the result of …rms' decisions to engage in R&D or to abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. This indicates that any policy intervention might not only a¤ect the level of a …rm's R&D performance but also the strategies adopted by …rms. In this paper we are particularly interested in analyzing how external market parameters such as the intensity of IPR protection and market competition, or the degree of product di¤erentiation a¤ect …rms' R&D strategy choices. For this purpose we extend the existing research by analyzing jointly the e¤ect of external and internal factors on a …rm's R&D strategy choice, innovation or imitation. The analysis is done both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
In the theoretical part of the paper we develop a two-stage Cournot model with di¤erentiated products and strategic R&D choice. In stage 1, …rms decide simultaneously what R&D strategy to apply, innovation or imitation. In stage 2, …rms compete in quantities with di¤erentiated products, conditional on their R&D strategy choice. We characterize the equilibria of this game and show how di¤erent innovation patterns that depend on the extent of spillovers, asymmetries between …rms and competitive pressure arise. Three types of equilibria are obtained: equilibria in which all …rms innovate, equilibria in which …rms choose asymmetric R&D strategies, and equilibria in which no …rm innovates. We …nd that the e¢ ciency of IPR protection positively a¤ects …rms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative e¤ect. In addition, smaller …rms are found to be more likely to become imitators when products are homogenous and the level of spillovers is high. Regarding social welfare, our results indicate that the strengthening of IPR protection can have an ambiguous e¤ect. If a market is characterized by a high rate of innovation, a reduction of IPR protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of IPR protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation.
Our empirical analysis tests the predictions derived from the theoretical model. We consider a …rms'R&D strategy choice between imitation and innovation. Our explanatory variables are internal factors (…rm size, "absorptive capacity", and geographical market size) and external factors (IPR protection, product di¤erenti-ation, competitive pressure, and demand uncertainty). We …nd a strong evidence for the main predictions of the theoretical model. A …rms'R&D strategy choice is tightly related to external factors. First, a lower level of spillovers provides incentives to engage in R&D. Second, competitive pressure, measured by the number of competitors, and higher product substitutability have a negative e¤ect on a …rm's decision to innovate.
The main policy implication derived from our analysis is that a common IPR protection policy for all markets might be inappropriate. This is because a policy that is bene…cial for a certain type of market might discourage innovation and technological progress in another with di¤erent characteristics. The analysis of spillovers on social welfare shows that a reduction of IPR protection, intended to induce imitation, can discourage innovative performance substantially in markets that are characterized by a high rate of innovation. Then, an additional reduction of IPR protection induces more imitation and increases welfare. However, after a certain point, the reduction of patent protection completely discourages innovation and therefore reduces social welfare. Moreover, IPR protection policy must be tightly coordinated with the competition policy. This is because external parameters such as IPR protection and competitive pressure jointly a¤ect the …rms' R&D strategy choice.
This paper is related to a large literature on the relationship between market structure and innovation strategy. Speci…cally, it is related to two strands in the literature. The …rst strand analyzes how …rms'R&D investments are a¤ected by market competition. Pioneer works in this …eld are those of Schumpeter (1934 and 1942) who argues that, on the one hand, market pressure may foster …rms'innovation, but, on the other hand, it may decrease …rms' R&D investments because monopoly power of larger …rms acts as a major accelerator of technological progress. Actually, there is still no accordance on this Schumpeterian debate in theoretical and empirical studies. For example, some authors argue that more intensive market competition decreases a …rm's incentives for innovation because when advantages from innovation are temporary, only su¢ cient market power guarantees that …rms invest in R&D (Arrow, 1962; Futia, 1980; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983; or Zhou, 2009 ). This argument is supported by empirical studies that …nd that market concentration increases the pace of innovative change. For instance, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show that large …rms in the US pharmaceutical industry perform R&D more e¢ ciently, as they can enjoy scale and scope economies. Using patent data of UK manufacturing …rms, Ce…s (2003) …nds that, due to innovative e¤ort, the contribution of large …rms to aggregated industrial performance is above the industry mean. On the other hand, market concentration is also argued to have a dampening e¤ect on innovation because more intensive competition acts as an important incentive for …rms to innovate (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980) . Again, these theoretical arguments are supported by empirical evidence (Geroski, 1990; Blundell et al., 1999) .
These contradictory results led to the hypothesis that the e¤ect of market competition on …rms'innovative e¤orts is non-monotonic. For example, Boone (2000) …nds that when competition is weak, the incentives of less e¢ cient …rms to innovate increase. However, when competition becomes more intense, the incentives of e¢ cient …rms to innovate grow. Aghion et al. (2005) suggest the existence of an inverted-U relationship. Both, a low or high level of competition provide low incentives to innovate while a medium level of competition fosters innovation of …rms operating on a similar technological level ("neck-and-neck …rms"). On the contrary, Tishler and Milstein (2009) …nd that R&D investments decrease with competitive pressure. However, at a certain level of competition …rms engage in "R&D wars" and spend excessively on R&D.
The above literature assumes that …rms'innovation behavior is homogeneous, that is, that all …rms innovate. However, empirical evidence suggests that most markets are characterized by an elevated heterogeneity of R&D activities. So, in most markets we …nd a core of …rms that are persistent innovators while other …rms either are occasional innovators or imitators (Ce…s and Orsenigo, 2000; Ce…s, 2003) . …nd that, depending on a …rm's role in the market, competitive pressure might have a di¤erent e¤ect on innovative e¤ort. So, while entry pressure decreases the average investment per …rm, it increases innovative e¤ort of market leaders.
The second strand of the literature to which this paper is related are studies that allow for heterogeneity in …rms'R&D strategies by distinguishing between …rms that innovate and those that imitate innovators. Theoretical studies have analyzed the e¤ect of the possibility of imitation on innovative incentives in two frameworks, economic growth models (Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Aghion & Howitt, 1992) and oligopolistic competition models (Zhou, 2009 ). In both cases, the imitation rate is assumed to be exogenously determined. Imitation is shown to foster the innovation activity of technological leaders. This …nding challenges the common view that patent protection should be strengthened. In fact, strong IPR protection may slow down the development of countries and decrease world welfare and consumer surplus (Helpman, 1993; Bessen & Maskin 2009; Che et al., 2009; Fershtman & Markovich, 2010) . Additionally, Braguinsky et al. (2007) …nd that the relationship between innovation and imitation itself depends on other factors such as the maturity of an industry. When the industry is young and small, innovators do not have incentives to prevent imitation. But when the industry expands, innovative e¤ort decreases because of imitation pressure.
Most of this literature assumes that innovators and imitators are exogenously given. Exceptions in the theoretical literature are Segestrom (1991) and Amir and Wooders (2000) . Applying an economic growth model, Segestrom (1991) allows …rms to participate in both innovative and imitative R&D races. In the steady-state, …rms'equilibrium R&D strategies depend on the distribution of previous R&D outcomes and the relative price of imitation. Firms are found to bene…t more from imitation in industries with a single leader, while in industries with several leaders innovation is a more pro…table strategy. In a standard oligopoly framework, Amir and Wooders (2000) show that, in equilibrium, …rms choose their R&D strategies asymmetrically. This gives rise to an innovator/imitator con…guration in the market. Regarding the empirical literature, the determinants of …rms' R&D strategy choices have been studied by a small number of authors. Using US marketing data, Robinson and Min (2002) …nd that innovators face higher survival risks associated with technological uncertainties. On the other hand, Zhou (2006) …nds that in the presence of demand uncertainty or with more competitive pressure …rms obtain higher bene…ts from being pioneers in innovation. Shankar et al. (1998) analyze data on sales and advertising of 13 brands of ethical drugs in the US. They show that imitators with a slightly di¤erentiated product can grow faster than initial innovators. Therefore, in the presence of rapidly changing technologies, in the long run, imitators obtain higher bene…ts than innovators because the innovator's initial pro…ts are rapidly discouraged.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical Cournot duopoly model of R&D strategy choice and extensions for the cases of asymmetric …rms and more than two-…rm competition. The empirical analysis is performed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the policy implications of our …ndings. Proofs are in the Appendix.
A duopoly model
In this section we develop a two-stage Cournot duopoly model with di¤erentiated products and strategic R&D choice. In stage 1, …rms decide simultaneously what R&D strategy to apply, innovation or imitation. In stage 2, …rms compete in quantities with di¤erentiated products, conditional on their R&D strategy choice. We assume that each …rm produces a single good and that the two goods are substitutes. The inverse demand function of good i is:
where p i is the price and q i is the quantity of good i. We assume that a > 0, b > 0, d 0. Furthermore, the absolute value of the own-price e¤ect on the quantity demanded is assumed to be higher than the corresponding e¤ect of the price of the substitute, thus b d 0.
The R&D strategy at stage 1 is realized by the choice of a binary variable x i , where x i = 1 stands for the …rm's decision to engage in R&D and x i = 0 means that the …rm abstains from innovation. R&D investment allows a …rm to reduce its unit production cost c by the amount x i at cost Kx i , where 2 [0; 1] and K > 0 are known constants. However, if a …rm abstains from investing in R&D at stage 1, due to spillovers, it's production cost still is reduced by imitating the rival's R&D outcomes. Concretely, if …rm i innovates and …rm j abstains from innovation but decides to imitate, the unit cost reduction for …rm j is x i . The parameter indicates to what extent a cost reduction of …rm i allows …rm j to reduce its own production costs. We assume that 2 [0; 1], where = 0 indicates that there are no spillovers and = 1 means that …rm j obtains the same cost saving as …rm i without any additional investment. 1 Resuming this, the unit production cost of …rm i is given by:
The equilibrium R&D strategies are obtained as a result of each …rm's best strategic response to the pro…t-maximizing strategy of the rival. The most interesting parameters that a¤ect a …rm's R&D strategy choice are the extent of spillovers in the industry and the degree of product di¤erentiation, which sometimes is interpreted as a measure for the intensity of competition in the industry (for instance, Tishler and Milstein, 2009 ).
The value of the spillover parameter re ‡ects the legal and technical framework of the industry, speci…cally, the level of IPR protection or the ease of knowledge transfer in the market. The polar cases are a blue print di¤usion in the absence of IPR protection, or the absolute ease of replication ( = 1), and an absence of any knowledge di¤usion when an invention can be completely protected by a patent, or a high level of knowledge sophistication that makes it impossible to replicate ( = 0). In practice, most markets can be characterized by some intermediate level of spillovers. The degree of product di¤erentiation varies from completely di¤erent products (d = 0) to homogeneous or identical products (d = 1). To exclude trivial cases we make restrictions on R&D costs: Assumption 1. Let K < K < K where K is de…ned by i (1; 1) = i (0; 0), i = 1; 2 and K is de…ned by
This assumption guarantees that costs are not too low such that making no R&D is a possible choice and that costs are not too high such that in the absence of spillovers …rms are interested in investing in R&D. Thus, the focus of the analysis is to characterize the conditions under which engaging in R&D is a Nash equilibrium. Assuming that …rm 1 decides to innovate, from expressions (6) and (9) we see that …rm 2 faces a trade-o¤ when choosing between innovation and imitation. On the one hand, if …rm 2 decides to innovate it must pay a cost K, which in turn allows to obtain a reduction of unit production costs. On the other hand, if …rm 2 decides to imitate, it saves the payment of the R&D cost K. Then, however, the decrease in unit production costs will be lower and depend on the R&D outcome of the innovator and the value of the spillover parameter.
To characterize the equilibria of the two-stage game, let be implicitly de…ned by i (1; 1) 2 (1; 0; ) = 0 and by 1 (1; 0; ) i (0; 0) = 0. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Existence of equilibria) For given parameter values (d; b; a; c; ) the equilibrium R&D strategies are characterized as follows:
(i) When spillovers are low ( ) there exists a pure strategy SPNE, in which both …rms engage in R&D (Region I).
(ii) When spillovers are intermediate ( ) there exist multiple pure strategy SPNE, in which one …rm engages in R&D and the other …rm chooses to imitate (Region II).
(iii) When spillovers are high ( ) there exists a pure strategy SPNE, in which none of the …rms engages in R&D (Region III).
The three regions are displayed in Figure 1 . In Region I there exists a unique SPNE in pure strategies in which both …rms innovate. This equilibrium is obtained when spillovers and R&D costs are low and when markets are large. Actually, Region I corresponds to the case of a highly innovative competitive industry with either an elevated level of knowledge protection or knowledge sophistication such that innovations are di¢ cult to copy. In Region III there exists a unique SPNE in which none of the …rms innovates. This equilibrium emerges in the presence of high spillovers and elevated product homogeneity. Region III is an example of markets where competition together with free knowledge ‡ows discourages innovation.
While …rms' R&D strategies in Regions I and III are symmetric, in Region II both …rms choose opposed strategies in equilibrium. Furthermore, we have multiple equilibria with one innovating and one imitating …rm. 4 This is the case for intermediate spillover levels. An increase in R&D cost K and a decrease in market size a c shifts the curves to the "south-west" so that Region I becomes smaller and innovation in Region II holds for lower spillover level. Interestingly, Amir and Wooders (2000) also …nd that initially symmetric …rms apply di¤erent R&D strategies in equilibrium and therefore perform asymmetrically. Their result holds for any submodular payo¤ function and Cournot and Bertrand competition. They also model one-way spillovers from an R&D innovator to an R&D imitator. However, they do not consider market factors that may a¤ect …rms' R&D strategy choices and analyze changes in social welfare only in comparison with the case where …rms create a research joint venture.
We deal with the multiplicity of equilibria in Region II by assuming that either pure-strategy equilibrium is played with equal probability. The qualitative nature of the results does not depend on the selection of the equilibrium but re ‡ects the initial symmetry between …rms and their choices. So, if we allow for mixed strategy equilibria the comparison of payo¤s and social welfare between regions remains the same. To illustrate the results of Proposition 2, we display the e¤ect of changes in spillovers on aggregate industry output and welfare for some parameter values in Figure 2 . We obtain two principal results. First, the relationship between the level of spillovers and aggregated industry output is non-monotonic. So, since the industry output is lower when spillovers are high than when they are low, for intermediate spillover levels an increase of increases industry output. Second, a similar result holds for the relationship between the level of spillovers and social welfare with the di¤erence that the welfare might be even higher for an intermediate spillover level than for a low one.
These results imply that the answer to the question of whether spillovers favor or discourage innovation is not straightforward. In our model spillovers have two di¤erent e¤ects on the level of R&D output. A …rst e¤ect is that with higher spillovers, in equilibrium, fewer …rms are innovators. This decreases R&D output. A second e¤ect is that with higher spillovers imitators obtain greater e¢ ciency gains from the use of innovators' less costly technology. This increases aggregated industry output and social welfare. While the …rst e¤ect tends to dominate if changes in spillover levels are large, the second e¤ect dominates for small variations of . However, because of discontinuities, small changes in spillovers can also lead to important reductions in R&D output, aggregated industry output and social welfare. Therefore, a crucial question is to …nd the right level of spillovers. This result provides a possible explanation to the long and controversial discussion concerning the duration of patents. 5 Regarding the e¤ect of product di¤erentiation on aggregated industry output and social welfare we …nd that when the product is more homogenous …rms need more IPR protection in order to maintain incentives for innovation. This …nding is supported by empirical evidence for U.S. drug companies in the 1970s and 1980s. For this data Shankar et al. (1998) show that the capacity to di¤erentiate products acts as an important factor for the imitators'survival.
Extension: Asymmetric …rms
The results of Section 2 can be extended for the case of initially asymmetric …rms where the inverse demand function of good i is:
and the unit production cost of …rm i is given by:
Without loss of generality we assume that initially …rm 1 is larger than …rm 2,
, and = (a 1 c 1 ) =M , this means that 2 1 2 ; 1 . The Nash-Cournot equilibrium output for …rm i is given by:
Now, four possible situations may occur. When none of the …rms innovates, …rms'outputs are given by:
The corresponding pro…ts are 1 (0; 0) = bq 1 (0; 0) 2 and 2 (0; 0) = bq 2 (0; 0) 2 . When both …rms innovate, the output of each …rm is:
The corresponding pro…ts are 1 (1; 1) = bq 1 (1; 1) 2 K and 2 (1; 1) = bq 2 (1; 1) 2 K. When only …rm 1 engages in R&D and …rm 2 decides to imitate, the …rms'outputs are:
The …rms'pro…ts are 1 (1; 0; ) = bq 1 (1; 0; ) 2 K and 2 (1; 0; ) = bq 2 (1; 0; ) 2 . Finally, if …rm 2 engages in R&D and …rm 1 decides to imitate, the …rms'outputs are: The …rms'pro…ts are 1 (0; 1; ) = bq 1 (0; 1; ) 2 and 2 (0; 1; ) = bq 2 (0; 1; ) 2 K. Let 1 be implicitly de…ned by 1 (1; 1) = 1 (1; 0; 1 ), 1 by 1 (0; 0) = 1 (1; 0; 1 ), 2 by 2 (1; 1) = 2 (1; 0; 2 ) and 2 by 2 (0; 0) = 2 (1; 0; 2 ). Then, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 (Existence of equilibria with asymmetric …rms) Compared to the case of symmetric …rms:
(i) The regions, in which both …rms innovate or none of them innovates (Regions I and III) become smaller when …rms are asymmetric, as for given values of d we have 2 < and 1 > .
(ii) The region with multiple equilibria in which one of the …rms innovates and the other imitates (Region II) becomes smaller, as for given d we have 1 > and 2 < .
(iii) A new region with a unique pure strategy SPNE emerges (Region IV). In this region the large …rm is an innovator and the small …rm an imitator.
The four regions with the resulting equilibria are displayed in Figure 3 . A speci…c feature of this extension is that allowing for initially asymmetric …rms leads to the emergence of an area where the larger …rm is an innovator and the smaller …rm chooses to imitate. A similar result was found by Cabral and Polak (2004) who show that an increase in a …rm's relative dominance raises incentives for that …rm to innovate and decreases those of the rival. Empirical evidence widely supports this result. For instance, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) using data from individual research programs of pharmaceutical …rms in the United States, suggest the advantage of large …rms in the conduct of basic research.
The di¤erence between the situations in Region II and Region IV can be explained in terms of the persistence of …rms' R&D strategies. In Region II we have equilibria where the optimal strategy of a …rm is opposed to that of the rival. If the rival innovates the best reply is to imitate, and vice versa. Therefore, in a repeated context of this game …rms will not follow a continuous innovation strategy in Region II. On the contrary, in Region IV initially asymmetric …rms always choose the same R&D strategy. The larger …rm innovates and the smaller …rm imitates. So, in Region IV, both …rms continuously choose the same R&D strategy. The results in Proposition 3 allow us to obtain testable predictions of how market conditions such as product di¤erentiation, …rm asymmetries and spillovers a¤ect …rm's R&D strategy choice.
Proposition 4 (The e¤ ect of , …rm asymmetry, on aggregated output and social welfare) (i) Aggregated industry output is constant in in all regions.
(ii) In all region there exists at least one equilibrium in which social welfare is increasing in .
Endogenizing a …rm's decision to innovate or to abstain from innovation we obtain that asymmetries between …rms, which may lead to a persistent innovator-imitator con…guration in the market, positively a¤ects social welfare. A similar result has been obtained by Cabral and Polak (2004) who examine the relation between …rm dominance and spillover levels. They …nd that an increase in market dominance of a …rm increases it's R&D spending and the …rm's pro…ts. However, it discourages other …rms to innovate. Which of the two e¤ects dominates depends on IPR protection. They conclude that dominance is good for innovation when property rights are strong but discourages innovation when the IPR protection is weak.
Extension: n …rms
In this section we analyze how the results extend to oligopoly markets with n initially symmetric …rms. In this case, the corresponding inverse demand function of good i is given by:
We assume that spillovers occur when at least one …rm decides to innovate. Thus, unit production cost are: 
In stage 2, …rm i chooses the output q i to maximize its operating pro…t:
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium output for …rm i is given by:
In stage 1, …rms choose their pro…t-maximizing R&D strategy. When all …rms engage in R&D (i.e. x 1 = ::: = x n = 1), outputs and pro…ts are: 
Furthermore, if all …rms except one, say …rm 1, engage in R&D the corresponding output and pro…t of …rm 1 are given by:
and 1 (0; 1; :::; 1; ) = bq 1 (0; 1; :::; 1; ) 2 . (23) Finally, if none of the …rms innovates, except one, say …rm 1, the corresponding output and pro…t of …rm 1 are given by:
and 1 (1; 0; :::0; ) = bq 1 (1; 0; :::0; )
To analyze how the frontiers of Region I and Region III depend on the number of …rms in the market, we examine a …rm's choice between innovation and imitation. First, we assume that all other …rms in the industry innovate. Second, we assume that all other …rms do not engage in R&D. Let n be such that i (1; 1; ::; 1) = 1 (0; 1; :::; 1; n ) and n such that 1 (1; 0; ::; 0; n ) = i (0; 0; ::; 0).
Proposition 5 (The e¤ ect of n, competitive pressure, on equilibria) Compared to the duopoly case with two symmetric …rms we have:
(i) The region, in which all …rms innovate (Region I) decreases with the number of …rms in the market as for given d we have n < n 1 .
(ii) The region, in which none of the …rms innovates (Region III) increases with the number of …rms in the market as for given d we have n < n 1 . Figure 4 displays how Regions I and III change when the number of …rms in the market increases. Regarding Region I, we observe that the probability of a particular …rm to engage in R&D decreases as the number of competitors increases. With more competitors initially symmetric …rms will be innovators only when products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated and IPR protection is high. This …nding is supported by empirical evidence from Shankar (1998) . Though Region I shirks with entry, notice that the overall innovative performance in the market increases within Region I as entrants also engage in R&D. With more competitors what was formerly Region II becomes more complex as further possible equilibria emerge. For example, with three …rms we can have multiple equilibria with one innovator and two imitators or with two innovators and one imitator. Concerning Region III, we …nd that the entry of new …rms means that equilibria with no innovating …rm will occur for lower spillover values and for more di¤erentiated products. Together, these results imply that the e¤ect of entry on total R&D performance and welfare depends on spillovers and product di¤erentiation. Concretely, we get the following result.
Proposition 6 (The e¤ ect of n, competitive pressure, on industry R&D output and welfare) (i) Entry increases total R&D output and welfare when spillovers are low and products are highly di¤erentiated.
(ii) Entry decreases total R&D output and welfare when spillovers are high and products are rather homogenous.
This result is similar to that of De Bondt et al (1992) who …nd that more rivals typically lead to reduced investments, output and pro…tability, while consumer surplus and welfare increase, or at least do not decrease. On the contrary, Tishler and Milstein (2009) show that social welfare decreases with the number of competitors. However, their model doesn't account for spillovers of R&D between …rms, and the increase in competition leads to excessive R&D spending.
Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis is intended to examine the consistency of the predictions that can be derived from the theoretical model. Speci…cally, it contributes to the literature by including …rm internal characteristics as well as external market parameters (competitive pressure, spillover level, product substitutability) in the analysis of a …rms'R&D decision. This is important, because the innovation strategy of a …rm must be considered in the context of its global market strategy as it serves to maintain and improve the …rm's market position. Therefore, when managers decide to launch an R&D project, they consider both internal …rm characteristics and external factors such as rivals' strategies, competitive pressure, knowledge speci…city, intellectual property protection, availability of funding, public support etc. A variation in one of these external factors might critically a¤ect the …rm's resources and capabilities and thereby the …rm's innovation strategy.
Empirical studies during the last decades discussed the determinants of R&D activity mainly based on internal …rm characteristics such as …rm size, appropriability of the outcomes of innovation, access to international markets, cooperation with customers, suppliers and others (Patel and Pavitt, 1992; Crépon et al., 1998; Loof and Heshmati, 2002; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005) . Less attention has been paid to external factors. This certainly is due to the problems that its measurement rises. For example, the intensity of market competition has been proxied with concentration measures, such as concentration ratios or the Hirshman-Her…nadahl index, based on industry data (Geroski, 1990; Blundel et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2005) . The problem with this approach is that the market in which …rms compete can hardly be identi…ed by the industrial sector. So, …rms within one sector might not compete at all if their products meet di¤erent consumer needs. Another example is the measurement of spillovers. The average spillover level has been measured with industry data as an average of …rm R&D expenditures in the industry (Bloom et al., 2007; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2007) . However, …rms can protect the outcomes of their R&D activity by using legal protection mechanisms as well as by secrecy. So, this indicator might wrongly re ‡ect the spillover level in the industry or in the market.
The common problem with the measurement of these variables is that market characteristics such as the …rm's market position, the level of knowledge protection or demand uncertainty are not directly observable. The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a survey used in this study, allows to improve the measures of external factors. This is because …rms provide information about these factors according to their own perceptions of market characteristics, which de…nitely determine their R&D strategies.
Data and variables
To investigate the determinants of …rms' R&D strategy choices, we use data from MIP conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). The database has a cross-sectional structure. It covers a representative sample of German manufacturing and service sectors during the period 1995-2007. It includes important information on the introduction of new products, services and processes within …rms, as well as details on innovation activity and the degree of success achieved by …rms through the introduction of new products and the improvement of processes. Remarkably, the MIP questionnaire of 2005 asks …rms about internal and external factors that a¤ect their decisions regarding commercialization and innovation during the period 2002-2004. Thereby, it provides valuable information for the purposes of our study.
Our dependent variable (STR) represents a …rm's R&D strategy choice. STR is a categorical variable that indicates if, between 2002 and 2004, a …rm did not introduce any innovation, introduced a product that is new for the …rm but known in the market or introduced a product that is new for the market. As it is common in the economic literature, we interpret the introduction of a product that is new for the market as innovation while the introduction of a product that is new for the …rm (but not for the market) is interpreted as imitation (Vinding, 2006) .
That the rate of innovating and imitating …rms varies across industries, can be observed for the representative sample of German …rms. In Table 1 we display the rate of innovating …rms for manufacturing and services sectors in the year 2005. The highest rate of non-innovating …rms can be observed in sectors such as mining, textiles and food and tobacco, and many of the services sectors. On the other hand, in sectors such as chemicals, medical instruments and electrical equipment we …nd that most …rms are innovators. Thus, we observe that …rms'R&D strategies vary across industries and markets which also agrees with the results of our theoretical model that suggest that the level of a …rm's innovative performance can be a¤ected by market characteristics. Consequently, to study …rms'R&D strategy choices, we include two categories of independent variables into our empirical model: variables that measure internal and external factors. As commonly used in …rm-level studies, our internal factors are: …rm size (SIZE02), absorptive capacity (AC03), …rm's group membership (GROUP), turnover from exports (EX02), geographical market size to which a …rm accesses (GEO), and, speci…c to our data, …rm location in the territory of former Eastern Germany (OST). 6 Most studies on …rm innovation control for …rm size, measured by the number of employees or turnover, as larger …rms are supposed to be more e¢ cient in the conduct of innovation (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005) . In our study SIZE02 is measured by the number of employees. Regarding GROUP and EX02, former studies suggest that …rms, which belong to the group, and …rms, which export abroad, have more incentives and resources for innovation. GEO is used as a proxy for the …rm´s market size. We distinguish between …rms that have access to di¤erent markets: local or regional markets, the German (i.e. nation-wide) market, the market of EU member, EU candidate and EFTA member countries and the world market. The variable GEO in the empirical analysis corresponds to (a c) in the theoretical model. Alternatively, SIZE02 is also related to (a c). According to the theoretical model, we expect a positive e¤ect of GEO and SIZE02 on a …rm's propensity to engage in R&D (see Proposition 1).
Apart from the traditional internal factors mentioned above, the literature adopted the term absorptive capacity, which is a measure of a …rm's ability to identify, assimilate and apply new knowledge given the …rm's experience, human capital skills, and organizational procedures' ‡exibility and relevance (Cohen and Levintal, 1989). Firms that have higher absorptive capacity are expected to dispose of more capability for R&D. There is a number of ways to measure a …rm's absorptive capacity (see Schmidt, 2005 ). Given the cross-sectional structure of our data, AC03 is measured as the proportion of all employees with a university degree or other higher education quali…cation in 2003. As a …rm's absorptive capacity depends on that of its employees, the general level of education, experience and training of employees, this seems to be a good proxy for a …rm's absorptive capacity. Finally, we use the dummy variable OST to control whether a …rm is located in former Eastern Germany. Historically, …rms belonging to the western and eastern part of Germany were a¤ected by di¤erent institutional settings. Therefore, the innovative performance might di¤er among …rms in these regions.
Regarding the external factors, our variables are: intellectual property rights protection (IPR and av_IPR), the pace of technological change (TEC), competitive pressure (COM), product di¤erentiation (DIF), and demand uncertainty (DEM). The MIP survey is based on …rms' perceptions regarding their external environment. Because manager's decisions are based on their subjective perceptions of external factors this allows to assess better the determinants of …rms' R&D strategy choices. The external factors IPR, TEC, DIF, DEM are represented by categorical variables. In order to get information on them, each …rm was asked to what extent it was a¤ected by these factors. Firms'answers take values in Likert scale from 0 ("not applicable") to 3 ("applies strongly").
The level of intellectual property protection is measured by IPR. IPR is an index constructed as the sum of the scores of the success of legal protection mechanisms for innovations and inventions (patents, registered and industry design, trademarks and copyright), rescaled from 0 (minimum level) to 1 (maximum level). To deal with possible endogeneity of IPR, as in Schmidt (2006), we calculate for each …rm the average IPR across the NACE 3-digit industry code excluding this …rm (av_IPR). A higher value of this variable means better protection of intellectual property (or more di¢ culty for copying). In the theoretical model this corresponds to a lower value of . We suggest a positive e¤ect of successful IPR protection in the industry on …rms'incentives to innovate. Another measure of spillovers is TEC, which is an evaluation of the pace of technological change in the industry provided by …rms. A higher value of TEC corresponds to a lower level of spillovers, as it re ‡ects higher knowledge complexity. Therefore, according to predictions from the theoretical model we expect a positive e¤ect of TEC on …rms'"innovativeness".
The variable COM is measured by the number of main competitors reported by a …rm. Since a …rm has better vision of its market, this indicator closer measures the intensity of market competition. This is a proxy for n, the number of …rms, in the theoretical model. According to Proposition 5, we expect a negative impact of competitive pressure on the propensity of a …rm to engage in R&D. Another indicator for competitive pressure is the degree of product substitutability (DIF) which corresponds to d=b, in the theoretical setup. From the theoretical results we do not get a clear prediction for the sign of the parameter estimate of this variable, i.e. for its in ‡uence on …rms' decisions to become innovators. The variable DEM measures demand uncertainty related to changes in consumers tastes. Following some previous studies, we expect that unforeseeable demand negatively a¤ects the incentives of …rms to innovate. Especially, it might discourage persistent innovation (see Caballero and Pindyck, 1996; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2008) . The asymmetries between …rms are captured by the parameter in the theoretical model. The e¤ect of is captured by the variables SIZE02 and GEO. We expect that a …rm that is larger than its rivals is more likely to engage in R&D, while a …rm that is smaller than its rivals would be more likely to become an imitator when product substitutability is high. We also control for unobserved heterogeneity in the innovative performance across sectors by, following OECD taxonomy for NACE Rev.1 codes, including 25 aggregated industry sectors and 5 industry classes (high-tech manufacturing, hightech services, medium-high-and medium-low-tech manufacturing, and low-tech manufacturing and services) according to R&D intensity. 7 A detailed description of the variables, their theoretical counterparts and expected signs are provided in Table 2 . Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the variables used. 28% of the …rms in our sample belong to high-tech services sectors, 8% to high-tech manufacturing and 27% to medium-tech manufacturing. Over 27% of …rms introduced product innovations that were new to their market by 2005, while 33% of …rms introduced products that were known to their market but new for the …rm. 40% of …rms abstained from innovation. The average …rm in the sample has 575 employees, among them, 20% have higher education. 34% of …rms are group members, and 34% of the …rms are from Eastern Germany. Over 70% of the …rms indicate that intellectual property is not well-protected, and only 1.5% recognize a high success of legal protection mechanisms. From the correlation analysis, we …nd that there are no systematic correlations between variables that could a¤ect the results of our econometric analysis.
Econometric analysis and results
We test our model using a multinomial logit and an ordinal logit speci…cation. A …rm chooses whether to engage in R&D considering:
where y i is the unobserved latent variable which is the utility obtained from continuous innovation activities. The vectors x i and z i contain the proxies for internal and external parameters that a¤ect the …rms'R&D strategy choice. The observed dependent variable y i is a choice between 3 alternatives: to abstain from innovation, to imitate and to engage in R&D. The probability that the ith response falls into the jth category is given by ij = Pr fy i = jg. The appropriate model to treat these probabilities would be one that considers them as unordered strategic choices, or, as naturally ordered strategy choices representing the degree of innovativeness in the …rm's activity.
First, consider the multinomial response model. 8 We are interested in analyzing how ceteris paribus changes in the elements of the vectors x i and z i of covariates associated with the ith individual a¤ect the response probability for category j:
where j = 1; :::; J. The assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives is tested by the standard Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) , which compares coe¢ cients obtained in a multinomial model with those obtained by pairwise estimation of alternatives chosen with the same reference in a binary choice model. Second, consider the ordinal logit model, which is obtained directly from a binary model by splitting y into J ordinal categories:
where j are the estimated cutpoints (thresholds). The probability of observing y = j for given values of x is:
For model evaluation we report pseudo-R 2 . The regression parameters usually are not interpreted directly. Instead, we consider marginal e¤ects of changes in regressors on the outcome probabilities. The marginal e¤ects of R&D strategies are reported with respect to the reference category, which is a …rm's decision to abstain from innovation. Table 4 provides the estimates for multinomial logit speci…cations. Table 5 provides the estimates for ordered logit speci…cations. Both estimated models show e¤ects of similar direction and magnitude. Hence, the e¤ects of market parameters on …rm R&D strategies are robust to the model speci…cation. The results suggest that a …rm's R&D strategy is a¤ected to great extent by both internal and external factors (see Tables 4 and 5 ). The pseudo-R 2 takes values from 0:1607 to 0:1987. As expected, …rm size, absorptive capacity and group membership have a signi…cant positive impact on a …rm's innovativeness, measured as its propensity to engage in innovation. Geographical market size also has a strong positive e¤ect. This fact provides empirical support for Propositions 1 and 3 of our theoretical setup. Notably, the location of a …rm in former Eastern Germany is related to a lower propensity of the …rm to engage in R&D, although this e¤ect is lowly signi…cant.
The estimation results suggest crucial importance of external (market) factors for a …rm's R&D strategy choice. The success of legal IPR protection in the industry crucially a¤ects a …rms'choice to engage in imitative or innovative activity. This might be due to several reasons. First, the reduction of uncertainty about the R&D outcomes and future pro…ts due to patent protection plays a very important role in the decision of …rms to engage in R&D. This result provides support for the arguments of Arora and Gambardella (1994), Gans and Stern (2003) , and Gans et al. (2008) that the perception of protection for new ideas provides more incentives for …rms to innovate. Second, better IPR protection might enhance open innovation. Acording to the "open innovation paradigm", …rms use patents as a channel of knowledge disclosure and dissemination. This bene…ts other …rms in the industry and allows them to be more innovative (Chesbrough, 2003) .
Competitive pressure measured by the number of main competitors negatively a¤ects …rms' incentives to innovate, which supports the results in Proposition 5. A similar result has been obtained in a previous study by who use a framework with Stackelberg competition and endogenous market entry. They conclude that entry pressure results in a decrease of …rm's innovation incentives. Although, when entry pressure is high, market leaders tend to spend more on R&D. Regarding the degree of product substitutability, we …nd a positive e¤ect. This indicates that in markets with highly substitutable products …rms have more incentive to do R&D. As expected, demand uncertainty negatively a¤ects …rms' decision to innovate. Most industry dummies result signi…cant. Concerning industry classes, medium-and high-tech manufacturing and high-tech services show signi…cant positive e¤ects with respect to the base category, other manufacturing and services sectors.
Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes how the equilibrium R&D strategies of …rms are a¤ected by external factors such as spillovers and competitive pressure. The theoretical and empirical analysis contributes to the understanding of a …rm's R&D strategy choice. In this paper, especially, we focus on a …rms'choice to innovate or to imitate.
From the theoretical model we obtain that when …rms choose endogenously their optimal R&D strategies three types of equilibria arise: equilibria in which all …rms innovate, equilibria in which …rms choose asymmetric R&D strategies with one innovating and one imitating …rm, and, …nally, equilibria in which no …rm innovates. We …nd that stronger intellectual property rights protection provides higher incentives for …rms to engage in R&D. Nevertheless, smaller …rms are less likely to be innovators in markets with homogenous product and high levels of spillovers. An increase in the number of competitors or more demand uncertainty decrease …rms' incentives to innovate. Regarding social welfare, depending on external factors, stronger intellectual property rights protection can provide both higher and lower incentives for …rms to engage in R&D. If a market is characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of IPR protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of IPR protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation and resulting in higher aggregate industry output.
Following the prediction from the theoretical model, in the empirical part of the paper we explicitly consider that …rms may have di¤erent innovation strategies (imitate or innovate) and analyze which factors a¤ect …rms' R&D strategy choice. Our explanatory variables are internal factors (…rm size category, absorptive capacity, and geographical market size) and external factors (product di¤erentiation, competitive pressure, IPR protection perception by …rms and on average in the industry, and demand uncertainty). We …nd strong empirical evidence for our main predictions from the theoretical model. A …rms'R&D strategy choice is tightly related to external factors. First, the e¢ ciency of legal IPR protection provides incentives to engage in R&D as it guarantees better appropriation of the bene…ts of innovation. Second, competitive pressure, measured by the number of competitors, has a negative e¤ect.
Some important policy implications are obtained from our results. We …nd that a common IPR protection policy irrespective speci…c market and …rms characteristics is inappropriate. The analysis of spillover e¤ects on social welfare shows that a reduction of IPR protection can discourage innovative performance but also allow for imitation with a positive total welfare e¤ect. Another implication of our …ndings is that the IPR protection policy must be tightly coordinated with the competition policy because external parameters such as IPR protection and competitive pressure jointly a¤ect the …rms'R&D strategy choice.
5 Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1
De…ne such that …rm i is indi¤erent between engaging and abstaining from R&D when …rm j imitates:
that is:
De…ne such that …rm i is indi¤erent between engaging and abstaining from R&D when …rm j engages in R&D:
First, consider the partial derivatives. From equations (26) and (28) we have:
To prove existence of the equilibria we make the following claims: Claim 1: > . We have:
This is an increasing function in K under assumption 1, i.e.
for K > K. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for > is that the condition holds for K = K: . Thus
Claim 3: > 0.
From assumption 1 we have
Together, claims 1-3 prove the existence of the di¤erent equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider aggregated output. We have:
and @q(1; 0; )=@ > 0 which proves the statements regarding aggregated output. Next, consider social welfare. When both …rms engage in R&D, (i.e. x i = 1, i = 1; 2) social welfare is:
If none of the …rms engages in R&D, (i.e. x i = 0, i = 1; 2) social welfare is:
Finally, if …rm 1 engages in R&D and …rm 2 decides to imitate, social welfare is: 
To prove statement (i), from (36) and (37) we have:
To prove statement (ii), consider the second derivative of (38):
Finally, to prove statement (iii), we analyze when
By de…nition of we have 2 (0; 1; ) = 2 (1; 1). So, (41) 
This is true if 2b > 3d or K <
Notice, that in case of homogeneous products the conditions are not ful…lled such that W (1; 0; ) > W (1; 1) .
Next, we analyze when W (1; 0; ) > W (0; 0).
By de…nition of we have 1 (1; 0; ) = 1 (0; 0). So (45) is equivalent to 
which always holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
From the de…nition of 1 , 1 , 2 and 2 we obtain:
A < 0 and (52)
which holds if K > 0. Similarly, statement (ii) is true if
which also holds if K > 0. Finally, statement (iii) follows directly from the former two. When all regions shrink, a new region must emerge. The characteristics of the equilibrium in this region follow from the de…nition of the regions'frontiers.
Proof of Proposition 4
Statement (i) follows immediately from:
which are all independent from .
To prove statement (ii), consider the social welfare in the di¤erent regions:
Di¤erentiation with respect to yields:
for 2 1 2 ; 1 . This guarantees that social welfare increases with in Regions I, III and IV in which we have a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the last expression is su¢ cient to guarantee that there is at least one equilibrium in Region II in which social welfare increases with . This happens when the large …rm is the innovator and the small …rm the imitator. In the opposite case, in which the small …rm is the innovator and the large …rm the imitator we get
Then, social welfare does not necessarily increase with .
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove statement (i), from the de…nition of n by i (1; :::; 1) 1 (0; 1; :::; 1; n ) = 0 we get:
From di¤erentiation we get:
which always holds. To prove statement (ii), from the de…nition of n by 1 (1; 0; ::; 0; n ) i (0; 0; ::; 0) = 0 we get:
which is an increasing function in K. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition is that this holds for K:
de…ned by j (1; 1; :::; 1) = j (1; 0; :::; 0; = 0) , j 6 = 1. This yields: 
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